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THE PRICE OF ANARCHY IN ROUTING GAMES AS A FUNCTION OF
THE DEMAND
ROBERTO COMINETTI, VALERIO DOSE, AND MARCO SCARSINI
Abstract. Most of the literature on the price of anarchy has focused on worst-case bounds for
specific classes of games, such as routing games or more general congestion games. Recently,
the price of anarchy in routing games has been studied as a function of the traffic demand,
providing asymptotic results in light and heavy traffic. In this paper we study the price of
anarchy in nonatomic routing games in the intermediate region of the demand. We begin by
establishing some smoothness properties of Wardrop equilibria and social optima for general
smooth costs. In the case of affine costs we show that the equilibrium is piecewise linear, with
break points at the demand levels at which the set of active paths changes. We prove that the
number of such break points is finite, although it can be exponential in the size of the network.
Exploiting a scaling law between the equilibrium and the social optimum, we derive a similar
behavior for the optimal flows. We then prove that in any interval between break points the
price of anarchy is smooth and it is either monotone, or unimodal with a minimum attained on
the interior of the interval. We deduce that for affine costs the maximum of the price of anarchy
can only occur at the break points. For general costs we provide counterexamples showing that
the set of break points is not always finite.
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1. Introduction
Nonatomic congestion games provide a model for the distribution of traffic over networks with
a large number of drivers, each one representing a negligible fraction of the total demand. The
model is based on a directed graph with one or more origin-destination pairs, and the costs are
identified with the delays incurred to go from origin to destination. The delay on an edge is a
nondecreasing function of the load of players on that edge, and the delay of a path is additive over
its edges. The standard solution concept for such nonatomic games is the Wardrop equilibrium,
according to which the traffic splits among paths of minimum delay. Hence, all the paths used in
equilibrium have the same delay, and the aggregate social cost experienced by the whole traffic
in the network is simply the common equilibrium cost multiplied by the total demand.
Equilibria are known to be inefficient, so that a social planner would be able to reduce the
social cost by redirecting flows along the network. The most common measure of inefficiency is
the price of anarchy (PoA), that is, the ratio of the social cost at equilibrium over the minimum
social cost. For nonatomic congestion games with affine costs, the value of the PoA is bounded
above by 4/3, and this bound is known to be sharp (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002). On the
other hand, for a large class of cost functions, including all polynomials, the PoA converges to
1 as the traffic demand goes either to 0 or to infinity. In other words, equilibria tend to perfect
efficiency both in light and heavy traffic (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2020).
Empirical studies have shown that in real networks, and for intermediate levels of the demand,
the PoA tends to oscillate and often does not reach the worst case bounds. Figure 1 shows a
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Figure 1. Oscillations of the price of anarchy
typical profile of the PoA as a function of the traffic demand. It starts at 1 for low levels of
traffic, then it exhibits some oscillations with a number of non-smooth spikes, and eventually it
decreases smoothly back to 1 in the highly congested regime. The shape and number of these
oscillations and spikes is the object of this paper.
1.1. Our contribution. We consider nonatomic routing games over a network with a single
origin-destination (OD), and we study the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the
traffic demand.
We start with some general results on the continuity and monotonicity of the equilibrium
costs and flows. We resort to the classical result in Beckmann et al. (1956) according to which a
Wardrop equilibrium is a solution of a convex optimization program. We show that the optimal
value of this program is convex and differentiable as a function of the demand, and its derivative
is precisely the equilibrium cost. A similar result is established for the minimum social cost.
When the costs have a strictly positive derivative, we show that the equilibrium loads and the
PoA are in fact C1 at each demand level that is regular, in the sense that all the optimal paths
carry a strictly positive flow. This regularity fails in particular at the so-called E-breakpoints,
which are demand levels at which the set of shortest paths at equilibrium changes.
For affine costs we bypass regularity and we show directly that the equilibrium cost is piecewise
linear and differentiable except at E-breakpoints. The key property is that a path that is optimal
2
at two demand levels remains optimal in between, from where it follows that the number of
E-breakpoints is finite though it can be exponentially large. It also follows that between E-
breakpoints the PoA is differentiable and either monotone, or unimodal with a unique minimum
on the interior of the interval, so that the maximum of the PoA is attained at an E-breakpoint.
We finally present several examples showing how these properties might fail for general costs.
1.2. Related Work. The standard solution concept in nonatomic routing games is due to
Wardrop (1952). Its mathematical properties were first studied by Beckmann et al. (1956),
while early algoritms for computing equilibria were proposed by Tomlin (1966) for affine costs,
and by Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) for general convex costs. For historical surveys on the
topic we refer to Florian and Hearn (1995) as well as Correa and Stier-Moses (2011).
Several papers have considered the sensitivity of the equilibrium flows and costs with respect
to variations of the traffic demand. Hall (1978) showed that an increase in the demand of
one OD pair always increases the equilibrium cost for that pair, whereas Fisk (1979) observed
that the cost on a different OD could be reduced. These questions were further explored by
Dafermos and Nagurney (1984). In a different direction, Patriksson (2004) characterized the
existence of directional derivatives for the equilibrium. Josefsson and Patriksson (2007) proved
that equilibrium costs are always directionally differentiable, whereas equilibrium edge loads not
always are. Englert et al. (2010) showed that there exist single OD network games where an
ε-increase in the traffic demand produces a global migration of traffic from one set of equilibrium
paths to a disjoint set of paths, but, nevertheless, the load on each edge changes at most by ε.
Moreover, if the cost functions are polynomials of degree at most d, then the equilibrium costs
increase at most of a multiplicative factor (1 + ε)d. Takalloo and Kwon (2020) extended this
last result to games with multiple OD pairs.
The recognition that selfish behavior produces social inefficiency goes back at least to Pigou
(1920). A measure to quantify this inefficiency was proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
(1999), by considering the ratio of the social cost of the worst equilibrium over the optimum social
cost. It was termed price of anarchy by Papadimitriou (2001). A PoA close to one indicates
efficiency of the equilibria of the game, whereas a high PoA implies that, in the worst scenario,
strategic behavior can lead to significant social inefficiency. Most of the subsequent literature
established sharp bounds for the PoA for specific classes of games, notably for congestion games
and in particular for traffic network games. Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) showed that for
every congestion game with affine costs the PoA is bounded above by 4/3. Moreover, this bound
is sharp and attained in a traffic game with a simple two-edge parallel network. Roughgarden
(2003) generalized this result to polynomial functions of maximum degree d showing that the
PoA grows as Θ(d/ log d). Dumrauf and Gairing (2006) refined the result when the cost functions
are sums of monomials whose degrees are between q and d. Roughgarden and Tardos (2004)
extended the analysis to all differentiable cost function c such that xc(x) is convex. Less regular
costs and different optimizing criteria for the social cost were studied by Correa et al. (2004,
2007, 2008).
Some papers took a more applied view and studied the actual value of the PoA in real
networks. Youn et al. (2008, 2009) dealt with traffic in Boston, London, and New York, and
noted that the PoA exhibits a similar pattern in the three cities: it is 1 when traffic is light, it
oscillates in the central region and then goes back to 1 when traffic increases. A similar behavior
was observed by O’Hare et al. (2016), who—taking an approach that relates to the one in this
paper—showed how an expansion and/or retraction of the routes used at equilibrium affect the
behavior of the PoA. Experimentally, Monnot et al. (2017) studied the commuting behavior of
a large number of Singaporean students and concluded that the PoA is overall low and far from
the worst case scenarios.
An analytical justification for the asymptotic efficiency of the PoA in light and heavy traffic
was presented in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2020, 2019), Wu et al. (2019). Colini-Baldeschi et al.
(2019) considered the case of single OD parallel networks and proved that, in heavy traffic, the
PoA converges to one when the cost functions are regularly varying. Their results were extended
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in various directions in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2020), considering general networks and analyzing
both the light and heavy traffic asymptotics. A different technique, called scalability, was used
by Wu et al. (2017, 2019, 2018) to study the case of heavy traffic.
A recent paper by Wu and Möhring (2020) considered issues that are quite close to the one
examined here. They defined a metric on the space of nonatomic congestion games that share the
same network, commodities, and strategies, but differ in terms of demands and cost functions.
Using this metric they showed that the PoA is a continuous function of both the demand and
the costs. Then they performed a sensitivity analysis of the PoA with respect to variations of
the game in terms of this metric.
The behavior of the PoA as a function of a different parameter was studied by Cominetti et al.
(2019). In that case the parameter of interest was the probability that players actually take
part in the game. Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2018) studied the possibility of achieving efficiency
in routing games via the use of tolls, when the demand can vary, while Gemici et al. (2019)
analyzed the income inequality effects of reducing the PoA via tolls.
1.3. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the concepts
of equilibrium and optimum are recalled and their properties are studied, as a function of the
demand. Section 3 deals with efficiency of equilibria and introduces the price of anarchy, together
with some of its general properties. The behavior of the PoA is studied in Section 4 for affine
costs. Section 5 shows various examples.
2. The nonatomic congestion model
We consider a standard nonatomic routing game with a single origin-destination pair. The
network is described by a directed graph G = (V, E) with vertex set V, edge set E ⊆ V × V, an
origin O ∈ V, and a destination D ∈ V. The traffic demand is given by a positive real number
µ ≥ 0, interpreted as vehicles per hour, to be routed along the set P of all simple paths from
O to D. The nonatomic hypothesis means that each vehicle controls a negligible fraction of the
total traffic.
The flow of traffic over path p is denoted by fp and the set of feasible flow profiles is denoted
by
Fµ =
f = (fp)p∈P : fp ≥ 0 and ∑
p∈P
fp = µ
. (2.1)
Every feasible flow profile f ∈ Fµ induces a load profile x = (xe)e∈E over the edges, with
xe =
∑
p3e fp representing the amount of traffic that travels over the edge e. We call Xµ the set
of all such load profiles. Note that the correspondence between flow profiles and load profiles is
not bijective, and a given load profile could be induced by more than one flow profile.
Every edge e ∈ E has an associated cost function ce : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞), which is assumed
nondecreasing and of class C1, i.e., continuous and differentiable with continuous derivative.
The value ce(xe) represents the travel time (or unit cost) of traversing the edge when the load
is xe. When traffic distributes according to f = (fp)p∈P with induced load profile x = (xe)e∈E ,
the cost experienced by traveling on a path p ∈ P is given by
cp(f) :=
∑
e∈p
ce
∑
p′3e
fp′
 = ∑
e∈p
ce(xe). (2.2)
With a slight abuse of language, we use the same symbol c for the cost function over paths and
over edges. The meaning should be clear from the context.
The total cost experienced by all users traveling across the network is called the social cost
and is denoted by
SC(f) :=
∑
p∈P
fp cp(f) =
∑
e∈E
xe ce(xe). (2.3)
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2.1. Wardrop equilibrium. A feasible flow profile f∗ ∈ Fµ is called a Wardrop equilibrium if
the paths that are actually used have minimum cost. Formally, f∗ is an equilibrium iff there
exists λ ∈ R such that {
cp(f
∗) = λ for each p ∈ P such that f∗p > 0,
cp(f
∗) ≥ λ for each p ∈ P such that f∗p = 0.
(2.4)
The quantity λ is called the equilibrium cost, and is a function of µ.
As noted by Beckmann et al. (1956), Wardrop equilibria coincide with the optimal solutions
of the convex minimization problem
V (µ) := min
f∈Fµ
∑
e∈E
Ce
∑
p′3e
fp′
 = min
x∈Xµ
∑
e∈E
Ce(xe), (2.5)
where Ce( · ) is the primitive of the edge cost ce( · ), that is,
Ce(xe) =
∫ xe
0
ce(z) dz. (2.6)
This follows by noting that Eq. (2.4) are the optimality conditions for V (µ), with the equilibrium
cost λ playing the role of a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
∑
p fp = µ. It follows that,
for each fixed demand µ ≥ 0, an equilibrium flow f∗ always exists.
Although Wardrop equilibria are not always unique, all of them induce the same edge costs
τe(µ) := ce(x
∗
e). In particular they have the same equilibrium cost λ = λ(µ), which is simply
the shortest O-D distance:
λ(µ) = min
p∈P
∑
e∈p
τe(µ). (2.7)
As a matter of fact, as proved by Fukushima (1984), the equilibrium edge costs τe = τe(µ) are
the unique optimal solution of the strictly convex dual program
min
τ
∑
e∈E
∫ τe
ce(0)
c−1e (z) dz − µ min
p∈P
∑
e∈p
τe. (2.8)
Since in equilibrium all the paths that carry flow have the same cost λ(µ), it follows that all
equilibria have the same social cost, that is,
SC(f∗) =
∑
p∈P
f∗p cp(f
∗) =
∑
p∈P
f∗p λ(µ) = µλ(µ). (2.9)
A less known property is the fact that the optimal value function µ 7→ V (µ) in (2.5) is
a smooth convex function with V ′(µ) = λ(µ). We summarize the previous discussion in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The function µ 7→ V (µ) is convex and differentiable for µ > 0, with V ′(µ) =
λ(µ) continuous and nondecreasing. Moreover, the equilibrium edge costs τe(µ) are uniquely
defined and are continuous as a function of µ. If the costs ce( · ) are strictly increasing, the
equilibrium loads x∗e(µ) = c−1e (τe(µ)) are also unique and depend continuously on µ.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. This is a consequence of the convex duality theorem. Indeed, consider
the perturbation function ϕµ : R|P| × R→ R ∪ {+∞}, given by
ϕµ(f , z) =
{∑
e∈E ce
(∑
p′3e fp′
)
if f ≥ 0, ∑p fp = µ+ z
+∞ otherwise.
(2.10)
Clearly ϕµ is a proper closed convex function (Rockafellar, 1997, page 24). Calling
vµ(z) = inf
f
ϕµ(f , z), (2.11)
we have vµ(z) = V (µ + z) and in particular vµ(0) = V (µ), which we consider as the primal
convex minimization problem (Pµ). From general convex duality, we have that z 7→ vµ(z) is a
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convex function; therefore, so is µ 7→ V (µ). Moreover, the perturbation function ϕµ yields a
corresponding dual
(Dµ) min
λ∈R
ϕ∗µ(0, λ), (2.12)
where ϕ∗µ is the Fenchel conjugate function, that is,
ϕ∗µ(0, λ) = sup
f ,z
〈0,f〉+ λz − ϕµ(f , z)
= sup
f≥0
λ
(∑
p
fp − µ
)
−
∑
e∈E
Ce
∑
p′3e
fp′
.
The convex duality theorem asserts that if vµ(0) is finite with vµ(z) <∞ for z in some interval
around 0, then there is no duality gap and the subdifferential ∂vµ(0) at z = 0 is nonempty,
compact and convex, and it coincides with the optimal solution set S(Dµ) of the dual problem.
Now, since vµ(z) = V (µ+z) and V (µ′) is finite for all µ′ ∈ (0,∞), the convex duality theorem
applies. It follows that V ( · ) is a finite convex function and ∂V (µ) = ∂vµ(0) = S(Dµ). It remains
to show that S(Dµ) is a singleton. To this end, fix an optimal solution f∗ for vµ(0) = V (µ)
and recall that this is just a Wardrop equilibrium. Having fixed such an f∗, the dual optimal
solutions λ ∈ S(Dµ) = ∂V (µ) are precisely the λ’s such that
ϕµ(f
∗, 0) + ϕ∗µ(0, λ) = 0.
This equation can be written explicitly as
∑
e∈E
Ce
(∑
p3e
f∗p
)
+ sup
f≥0
λ
(∑
p
fp − µ
)
−
∑
e∈E
Ce
∑
p′3e
fp′
 = 0,
from which it follows that f = f∗ is an optimal solution in the latter supremum. The corre-
sponding optimality conditions are
λ−
∑
e∈p
ce
∑
p′3e
f∗p′
 = 0, if f∗p > 0,
λ−
∑
e∈p
ce
∑
p′3e
f∗p′
 ≤ 0, if f∗p = 0,
which imply that λ is the equilibrium cost for the Wardrop equilibrium, that is, λ = λ(µ). It
follows that ∂V (µ) = {λ(µ)} so that µ 7→ V (µ) is not only convex but also differentiable with
V ′(µ) = λ(µ). The conclusion follows by noting that every convex differentiable function is
automatically of class C1, with V ′(µ) nondecreasing.
The continuity of the equilibrium edge costs τe = τe(µ) is a consequence of Berge’s maximum
theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Section 17.5). Indeed, the equilibrium edge
costs are optimal solutions for the dual program in Eq. (2.8). Since the objective function is
jointly continuous in (τ, µ), Berge’s theorem implies that the optimal solution correspondence is
upper-semicontinous. However, in this case the optimal solution is unique, so that the optimal
correspondence is single-valued, and, therefore, the equilibrium edge costs τe(µ) are continuous.
The last claim about the continuity of the equilibrium edge loads x∗e(µ) follows directly from
this. 
Remark 2.1. For multiple origin-destination networks with strictly increasing costs, the conti-
nuity of the equilibrium flows x∗e as a function of the demands was already established in Hall
(1978, Theorem 1). Also, Hall (1978, Theorem 2) proved the continuity of the equilibrium costs
by assuming that all the paths carry a strictly positive flow, while Hall (1978, Theorem 3) showed
that the equilibrium cost of each OD increases with the corresponding demand. As shown above
in Proposition 2.1, for a single origin-destination network the continuity of the equilibrium cost
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holds in general and it requires neither that the costs be strictly increasing nor that all paths
carry a strictly positive flow.
Under additional hypotheses, we can prove the differentiability of the equilibrium cost λ(µ)
and the resource loads x∗e(µ). This follows from the implicit function theorem applied to the
following system of first order optimality conditions for Eq. (2.5). Given a vertex v ∈ V, call
N+(v) and N−(v) the sets of out-edges and in-edges of v, respectively, and P(O, v) the set
of all paths from O to v. Then, an equilibrium load profile (x∗e)e∈E for a total demand µ is
characterized as a solution of
xe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E , (2.13)
∑
e∈N+(v)
xe −
∑
e∈N−(v)
xe =

0 if v 6= O,D,
µ if v = O,
−µ if v = D,
for all v ∈ V, (2.14)
TO = 0 and Tw ≤ Tv + τe for all e = (v, w) ∈ E , (2.15)
xe · (Tw − Tv − τe) = 0 for all e ∈ E , (2.16)
τe = ce(xe) for all e ∈ E , (2.17)
where τe is the equilibrium cost of the edge e and
Tv := min
p∈P(O,v)
∑
e∈p
τe (2.18)
is the equilibrium cost of a shortest path from the origin O to vertex v.
For the subsequent analysis we define the active network as the set of all edges that lie on
some shortest path. We also consider the demand levels at which this set changes.
Definition 2.2. For each µ > 0 we let P(µ) be the set of all shortest paths from the source O
to the sink D with cost at equilibrium equal to λ(µ), and we define the active network E(µ) as
the union of the edges on all these paths p ∈ P(µ). The demand µ0 is called an E-breakpoint if
there exists ε > 0 such that E(µ) is constant over the intervals [µ0−ε, µ0) and (µ0, µ0+ε], with
E(µ0−ε) 6= E(µ0+ε).
Remark 2.2. Since the equilibrium costs τe = τe(µ) are unique, the same holds for λ(µ), and
therefore both P(µ) and E(µ) are univocally determined for each µ. Moreover, the continuity of
τe(µ) implies that an edge e 6∈ E(µ0) that is inactive at µ0 remains inactive for µ near µ0, that
is to say E(µ0)c ⊆ E(µ)c.
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the active network at different demand levels for the game in
Fig. 1(a), with five E-breakpoints at µ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 7. Notice the correspondence with the break
points in the price of anarchy in Fig. 1(b).
(a) 0 ≤ µ < 1 (b) 1 ≤ µ < 2 (c) 2 ≤ µ ≤ 3
(d) 3 < µ < 4 (e) 4 ≤ µ ≤ 7 (f) 7 < µ <∞
Figure 2. The active network for the graph on Fig. 1, with E-breakpoints at µ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 7.
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Although in general there can be infinitely many E-breakpoints (see Proposition 5.1 and
Remark 5.1), their number is finite for series-parallel networks (cf. Proposition 2.7) and also for
general networks with affine costs (cf. Proposition 4.2). In both cases, once an active network
changes it may never occur again at higher demand levels.
Note that an edge carrying a strictly positive flow at equilibrium must be on some optimal
path, and, as a consequence, belongs to the active network. However, the converse may fail when
a path becomes active but carries no flow. In order to prove the smoothness of the equilibrium
flows we need to avoid this situation, which leads to the following definition of a regular demand.
Definition 2.3. A demand µ is called regular if there is an equilibrium with xe > 0 for all
e ∈ E(µ).
Regularity can be seen as a restricted form of strict complementarity. Indeed, the comple-
mentarity condition (2.16) imposes that for each e ∈ E either xe or (Tw − Tv − τe) is zero, while
regularity requires that for each active edge e ∈ E(µ) exactly one of these expressions is zero
while the other is not zero. For strictly increasing costs this property implies that the active
network is locally constant, so that a regular demand cannot be an E-breakpoint. However, in
general, regularity is a stronger requirement and there can be non-regular demands at which the
active network is still locally constant (see Example 5.2).
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that the costs ce( · ) are strictly increasing. If µ0 is a regular demand level
then the active network E(µ) is locally constant for all µ near µ0.
Proof. From regularity all active edges e ∈ E(µ0) satisfy x∗e(µ0) > 0. By Proposition 2.1 the
maps x∗e(·) are continuous, so these strict inequalities are preserved for µ near µ0, and therefore
E(µ0) ⊆ E(µ). This, combined with Remark 2.2, yields E(µ) = E(µ0) for µ close to µ0. 
We are now ready to establish smoothness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5. Assume the costs ce( · ) are continuously differentiable with strictly positive
derivative. If µ0 is a regular demand level then the map µ 7→ (x∗(µ), τ (µ),T (µ)) is continuously
differentiable in a neighborhood of µ0. In particular the equilibrium cost µ 7→ λ(µ) is C1 near
µ0.
Proof. From Proposition 4.2 we know that for each µ > 0 we have unique equilibrium costs
τ (µ) = (τe(µ))e∈E and loads (x∗e(µ))e∈E , which vary continuously with µ. It follows that the
equilibrium cost Tv(µ) of a shortest path to any vertex v is also continuous. These functions
x∗e, τe and Tv satisfy in particular Eqs. (2.14), (2.16) and (2.17).
Now, since µ0 is regular, the active network is locally constant. Let E0 = E(µ0) denote the
active network in a neighborhood of µ0, and V0 the corresponding vertices. We observe that for
µ near µ0 we have x∗e(µ) = 0 for all e 6∈ E0, hence these functions are trivially differentiable.
Also for w 6∈ V0 we can take v ∈ V0 the last vertex on a shortest path from O to w, so that
Tw(µ) = Tv(µ) + ∆v,w where ∆v,w is a constant travel time from v to w. Hence it suffices to
establish the smoothness of x∗e(µ) for e ∈ E0 and Tv(µ) for v ∈ V0. To this end, we consider
Eqs. (2.14), (2.16) and (2.17) restricted to the edges in E0, together with the equation TO = 0,
which gives the following system:∑
e∈N+(v)∩E0
xe −
∑
e∈N−(v)∩E0
xe =
{
0 if v 6= O,D,
µ if v = O,
for all v ∈ V0, (2.19)
xe · (Tw − Tv − τe) = 0 for all e = (v, w) ∈ E0, (2.20)
τe = ce(xe), (2.21)
TO = 0. (2.22)
To apply the implicit function theorem to this reduced system, we have to check that the
associated linearized system has a unique solution. Let ue, δv and se be respectively the incre-
ments in the variables xe, Tv and τe for each e ∈ E0 and v ∈ V0. The homogeneous linear system
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obtained from (2.19)–(2.22) is:∑
e∈N+(v)∩E0
ue −
∑
e∈N−(v)∩E0
ue = 0 for all v ∈ V0, (2.23)
xe(δw − δv − se) + ue(Tw − Tv − τe) = 0 for all e = (v, w) ∈ E0, (2.24)
se = c
′
e(xe)ue, (2.25)
δO = 0. (2.26)
Strict complementarity on an active link implies that Eq. (2.24) is equivalent to
δw = δv + se for all e = (v, w) ∈ E0, (2.27)
which, together with Eq. (2.25), gives
δw = δv + c
′
e(xe)ue for all e = (v, w) ∈ E0. (2.28)
These equations are the stationarity conditions for the strongly convex (since c′e(xe) > 0) qua-
dratic program
min
u
∑
e∈E0
1
2
c′e(xe) · u2e (P)
under the constraints Eq. (2.23). Indeed, associating a Lagrange multiplier to each of those
constraints, we get the Lagrangian
L(u, δ) =
∑
e∈E0
1
2
c′e(xe)u
2
e +
∑
v∈V0
δv
 ∑
e∈N+(v)∩E0
ue −
∑
e∈N−(v)∩E0
ue

and the equation ∂L/∂ue = 0 is precisely equivalent to Eq. (2.28). Hence, every solution of
(2.23)–(2.26) corresponds to an optimal solution of (P). Since ue = 0 for all e ∈ E0 is feasible,
it is also the unique optimal solution. It follows that ue = 0 for all e ∈ E0, and Eq. (2.25) yields
se = 0 for all e ∈ E0. Finally, from Eqs. (2.26) and (2.27) we obtain also δv = 0 for all v ∈ V0.
We showed that the linear system (2.23)–(2.26) has only the trivial solution, thus the Jacobian
of (2.19)–(2.22) with respect to x, τ ,T is invertible and the implicit function theorem implies
the smoothness of the solution. In particular λ(µ) = TD(µ) is continuously differentiable. 
Our next result shows that, in networks with a series-parallel topology (which excludes the
Wheatstone network), the active network increases monotonically with the demand, which yields
a sharp bound on the number of different active networks and E-breakpoints that can occur as
the demand grows from 0 to +∞.
Definition 2.6. The class of series-parallel (SP) networks can be constructed as follows:
• A network with two vertices O,D and one edge (O,D) connecting them is SP.
• A network obtained by joining in series two SP networks by merging D1 with O2 is SP.
• A network obtained by joining in parallel two SP networks by merging O1 with O2 and
D1 with D2 is SP.
Proposition 2.7. Let G be a finite series-parallel network. Then there exists an equilibrium load
profile x(µ) whose components xe(µ) are nondecreasing functions of the demand µ. Moreover,
the active network E(µ) is also nondecreasing with respect to inclusion and, as a consequence,
the number of E-breakpoints is bounded by the minimum between the number of paths and the
number of edges.
Proof. The result clearly holds for the network with only two vertices and a single link.
Let G1 and G2 be two series-parallel networks for which the result is true, and fix two non-
decreasing equilibrium loads x1(µ) and x2(µ), with their corresponding equilibrium costs λ1(µ)
and λ2(µ) and active networks E1(µ) and E2(µ).
If G1 and G2 are connected in series, then an equilibrium is given by the coupling x(µ) =
(x1(µ),x2(µ)) with active network E(µ) = E1(µ)∪E2(µ), all of which are nondecreasing with µ.
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The case in which G1 and G2 are joined in parallel, is slightly more involved. Here an
equilibrium splits as x(µ) = (x1(µ1),x2(µ2)) where µ1 + µ2 = µ with µ2 = 0 if λ1(µ) <
λ2(0), µ1 = 0 if λ2(µ) < λ1(0), and λ1(µ1) = λ2(µ2) otherwise. More explicitly, if we let
g(µ) = inf{x ∈ [0, µ] : λ1(x) ≥ λ2(µ − x)}, with g(µ) = µ when the latter set is empty,
then both µ1 = g(µ) and µ2 = µ − g(µ) turn out to be nondecreasing and therefore x(µ) =
(x1(g(µ)),x2(µ−g(µ))) is a nondecreasing equilibrium. The monotonicity of the active network
E(µ) is similar. We have E(µ) = E1(µ) if λ1(µ) < λ2(0), E(µ) = E2(µ) when λ2(µ) < λ1(0),
and E(µ) = E1(g(µ)) ∪ E2(µ − g(µ)) otherwise, and in all three cases the active network is
nondecreasing. 
3. Efficiency of equilibria
A feasible path-flow f˜ ∈ Fµ is called an optimum flow if it minimizes the social cost, that is
to say, f˜ is an optimal solution of
V˜ (µ) := min
f∈Fµ
SC(f) = min
f∈Fµ
∑
e∈E
C˜e
∑
p′3e
fp′
, (3.1)
where C˜e(xe) = xe ce(xe). Since ce( · ) is C1, it follows that the marginal cost functions
c˜e(xe) := C˜
′
e(xe) = ce(xe) + xe c
′
e(xe) (3.2)
are well defined and continuous. If we further assume C˜e( · ) to be convex, then c˜e( · ) is non-
decreasing and it follows that the optimal flows coincide with the Wardrop equilibria f˜ ∈ Fµ
for the marginal costs c˜e( · ). The symbol λ˜(µ) denotes the corresponding equilibrium cost, E˜(µ)
the active network, and µ˜0 the E-breakpoints. Proposition 2.1 then yields the following direct
consequence:
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that ce( · ) are C1 and nondecreasing with xe 7→ xe ce(xe) convex. Then
the optimal social cost map µ 7→ V˜ (µ) is a C1 convex function with V˜ ′(µ) = λ˜(µ) continuous
and nondecreasing.
Since every equilibrium flow has the same equilibrium cost, we can define the price of anarchy
(PoA) for each µ ∈ [0,+∞) as the ratio between the social cost at an equilibrium flow f∗(µ)
and the social cost at an optimum flow f˜(µ):
PoA(µ) :=
SC(f∗(µ))
SC(f˜(µ))
=
µλ(µ)
V˜ (µ)
. (3.3)
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that ce( · ) are C1 and nondecreasing with xe 7→ xe ce(xe) convex.
Then the function µ 7→ PoA(µ) is continuous in [0,+∞) and differentiable at every µ where
the equilibrium cost λ(µ) is differentiable. In particular, if the derivatives c′e(x) > 0 are strictly
positive, then PoA(·) is continuously differentiable at each regular demand level µ0.
Proof. Recall from Section 2.1 that the social cost at equilibrium is equal to µλ(µ) and is
continuous on [0,+∞), while Corollary 3.1 implies that the optimal social cost is differentiable
on (0,+∞). This implies the first part of the proposition. The second part is a consequence of
Proposition 2.5. 
Wu and Möhring (2020) have recently established a very general result on the continuity of the
PoA with respect to the demands and also with respect to perturbations of the cost functions.
However, the differentiability in Proposition 3.2 was not addressed in that paper.
Since regularity fails at E-breakpoints, these are natural candidates to be points of non-
differentiability for the equilibrium cost λ(µ) and for the price of anarchy PoA(µ). However,
we note that in general there might be other demand levels that are not regular and where
smoothness is not insured. In the next section we show that for affine costs we have a more
complete picture and, in particular, that non-smoothness can only occur at E-breakpoints.
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4. Networks with affine cost functions.
In this section we consider the case of affine cost functions
ce(x) = ae · x+ be, (4.1)
with ae, be ≥ 0 for each e ∈ E . A first remark is that for affine costs we have a scaling law that
relates the equilibrium and optimum flows.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that ce is affine for all e ∈ E. For each µ ∈ [0,+∞), let f∗(µ) be an
equilibrium flow with corresponding load x∗(µ). Then, we have that
x˜(µ) =
1
2
x∗(2µ) (4.2)
is a socially optimal load, which yields a corresponding scaling law for the optimal flows:
f˜(µ) =
1
2
f∗(2µ). (4.3)
Proof. The equilibrium x∗(µ) is an optimal solution of
x∗(µ) ∈ arg min
x∈Xµ
∑
e∈E
∫ xe
0
ce(z) dz, (4.4)
which, in the case of affine cost functions, assumes the form
x∗(µ) ∈ arg min
x∈Xµ
∑
e∈E
ae
x2e
2
+ bexe (4.5)
= arg min
x∈Xµ
∑
e∈E
xe ·
[
ae
(xe
2
)
+ be
]
(4.6)
= arg min
x∈Xµ
∑
e∈E
xe
2
· ce
(xe
2
)
. (4.7)
It remains to observe that the scaled variables xe/2 in Eq. (4.7) identify an optimal load profile
for the scaled demand µ/2, from which we get Eq. (4.2). 
Remark 4.1. As a consequence of the previous result, it follows that for affine costs the E-
breakpoints for the optimum are in one-to-one correspondence with the E-breakpoints for the
equilibrium, that is,
µ˜0 =
1
2
µ0. (4.8)
We now describe the behavior of the equilibrium and the price of anarchy. We first show
that any given subset of edges E0 ⊆ E can only be an active network over an interval. In other
words, once a given active network changes it will never become active again. This implies
that the number of E-breakpoints is finite. Moreover, we show that between E-breakpoints the
equilibrium costs and flows are affine.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the costs ce( · ) are affine. Let E0 ⊆ E and suppose that µ1 < µ2
are such that E(µ1) = E(µ2) = E0. Then, for every µ ∈ [µ1, µ2] we have E(µ) = E0 and we can
select an equilibrium flow f(µ) that is affine in µ. Moreover, the equilibrium cost λ(µ) is also
affine on the interval [µ1, µ2], more precisely λ(µ) = α+ βµ with α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.
Proof. Let f1 and f2 be equilibrium profiles for µ1 and µ2, and consider the following affine
interpolation with θ = θ(µ) := (µ− µ1)/(µ2 − µ1) ∈ [0, 1]
f(µ) = (1− θ)f1 + θf2 ∈ Fµ. (4.9)
The corresponding load profile is given by x(µ) = (1−θ)x1 +θx2 and, since the costs are affine,
it follows that ce(xe(µ)) = (1 − θ)ce(x1e) + θce(x2e). Hence, the same affine behavior holds for
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the path costs cp(f(µ)) = (1− θ)cp(f1) + θcp(f2). Now, since E(µ1) = E(µ2) = E0, the optimal
paths are the same for µ1 and µ2. Thus, if p is an optimal path and p′ is not optimal we have
cp(f
1) = λ(µ1) < cp′(f
1)
cp(f
2) = λ(µ2) < cp′(f
2)
and taking a convex combination of these inequalities we get
cp(f(µ)) = (1− θ)λ(µ1) + θλ(µ2) < cp′(f(µ)).
This implies that the paths p and p′ remain respectively optimal and non-optimal for µ. It
follows that E(µ) = E0 and also that f(µ) is an equilibrium with λ(µ) = (1− θ)λ(µ1) + θλ(µ2).
This shows that the equilibrium cost is affine over the interval [µ1, µ2], that is, λ(µ) = α+βµ.
From Proposition 2.1 we know that λ(µ) is non-decreasing so that β ≥ 0, and therefore it
remains to show that α ≥ 0. We rewrite the interpolated flow as f(µ) = µw + z with
w =
f2 − f1
µ2 − µ1 ,
z =
µ2f1 − µ1f2
µ2 − µ1 .
Let P0 be the set of all the O-D shortest paths included in E0. We observe that zp = 0 for every
p 6∈ P0, and also that
∑
p∈P ze = 0. On the other hand, since f(µ) is an equilibrium we have
cp(f(µ)) = λ(µ) for all p ∈ P0, so that 〈c(f(µ)), z〉 = 0 and, as a consequence,
µλ(µ) = 〈c(f(µ)),f(µ)〉 = 〈c(f(µ)), µw + z〉 = µ〈c(f(µ)),w〉. (4.10)
Defining
A = Z>ΓZ and β = Z>b, (4.11)
with Z the edge-path incidence matrix, Γ = diag[(ae)e∈E ], and b = (be)e∈E , the vector of path
costs can be expressed as
c(f(µ)) = Af(µ) + β = µAw +Az + β, (4.12)
so that
λ(µ) = 〈c(f(µ)),w〉 = µ〈Aw,w〉+ 〈Az+β,w〉, (4.13)
which yields β = 〈Aw,w〉 and α = 〈Az+β,w〉. Since A is positive semidefinite, we get again
β ≥ 0. Now, since 0 = 〈c(f(µ)), z〉 = µ〈Aw, z〉+〈Az+β, z〉 for all µ, it follows that 〈Aw, z〉 = 0
so that α = 〈β,w〉, and also 〈Az + β, z〉 = 0 so that 〈β, z〉 = −〈Az, z〉 ≤ 0. To conclude, we
note that all the entries in f(µ) and in β are nonnegative, and therefore
0 ≤ 〈f(µ),β〉 = µ〈w,β〉+ 〈z,β〉, (4.14)
from which we deduce that α = 〈w,β〉 ≥ 0 as claimed. 
4.1. Behavior of the Price of Anarchy. We now prove that the social cost at the equilibrium
and at the optimum have a very similar quadratic form, from which we deduce that between
E-breakpoints the function µ 7→ PoA(µ) is unimodal and its maximum must be attained at some
of the E-breakpoints.
Proposition 4.3. Let µk and µk+1 be two consecutive E-breakpoints for the equilibrium. Then,
there exist αk ≥ 0, βk ≥ 0, and γk ≤ 0, such that
SC(f∗(µ)) = αkµ+ βkµ2 when µ ∈ (µk, µk+1), (4.15)
SC(f˜(µ)) = γk + αkµ+ βkµ
2 when 2µ ∈ (µk, µk+1), i.e., µ ∈ (µ˜k, µ˜k+1). (4.16)
Proof. Since SC(f∗(µ)) = µλ(µ), the equality (4.15) follows directly from Proposition 4.2. In
order to prove (4.16), let f(µ) be the affine interpolated equilibria as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.2. When 2µ ∈ (µk, µk+1), the scaling law (4.3) implies that an optimum flow is given
by
f˜(µ) = 12f(2µ) = µw +
1
2z.
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Then the social cost at optimum will be a quadratic function in µ with the same quadratic and
linear coefficient of the social cost at equilibrium, while the constant coefficient will be
1
4
〈Az, z〉+ 1
2
〈β, z〉,
which is less or equal to 〈Az, z〉+ 〈β, z〉 = 0 since 〈Az, z〉 ≥ 0 and 〈β, z〉 ≤ 0. 
Using this result it follows that the PoA between E-breakpoints has a very specific form as a
quotient of quadratics, from which we deduce that local maxima can exist only at E-breakpoints.
Proposition 4.4. Let µk and µk+1 be two consecutive E-breakpoints for the equilibrium. Then
on the interval (µk, µk+1) the function µ 7→ PoA(µ) is smooth and it is either decreasing, or
increasing, or unimodal being first decreasing and then increasing with a local minimum on the
interior of the interval. In particular PoA(µ) does not attain a local maximum on (µk, µk+1).
Proof. From Corollary 3.1 the optimal social cost is a C1 function of µ, so that Eq. (4.15) implies
that PoA(µ) is smooth over the full interval (µk, µk+1). Consider first the case when there is no
E-breakpoint µ˜` for the optimum in this interval. Using Eqs. (4.15) and (4.16) we can express
the PoA in the form
PoA(µ) =
SC(f∗(µ))
SC(f˜(µ))
=
αµ+ βµ2
γ + δµ+ εµ2
,
with α, β, δ, ε,≥ 0 and γ ≤ 0. The derivative is given by
PoA′(µ) =
1
SC(f˜(µ))2
· [αγ + (2βγ)µ+ (βδ − αε)µ2]
and, since αγ ≤ 0 and 2βγ ≤ 0, it can have at most one positive zero, and only if βδ − αε > 0.
Hence, either PoA′(µ) has a constant sign over (µk, µk+1), or it changes from negative to positive
if the zero lies on (µk, µk+1), in which case we have a local minimum at this zero.
If the optimum has E-breakpoints in (µk, µk+1), we can repeat the argument on each subinter-
val, noting that PoA(µ) is C1 so that the sign PoA′(µ) does not change at these E-breakpoints.

4.2. Number of E-breakpoints. Even for affine costs, the number of E-breakpoints can be
exponential in the number of paths.
Proposition 4.5. There exist networks with affine costs where the set of paths P has n elements
and the number of E-breakpoints is of the order of 2n/2.
Proof. Let G1 and G2 be the following one-link and two-link parallel networks
O1 D10
(a) The network G1
O2 D2
x
1 + x
(b) The network G2
which have 0 and 1 E-breakpoints respectively. Define inductively the network Gn with origin
On and destination Dn as
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On
On−2
Dn−2
DnGn−2
x
kn
kn
x
where kn is a constant such that
kn > λn−2(µn−2) + 2µn−2,
with µn−2 the largest E-breakpoint for Gn−2 (with the convention µ1 = 0), and λn−2(µn−2) the
corresponding equilibrium cost.
Note that Gn has exactly n paths from On to Dn. Indeed, clearly G1 and G2 have 1 and 2
paths respectively, while Gn has the number of paths of Gn−2 plus the two external ones.
We claim that Gn has twice the number of E-breakpoints of Gn−2 plus one. Indeed, when the
demand is less than µn−2 the active network at equilibrium for Gn contains the active network
for Gn−2 plus the edges {On, On−2} and {Dn−2, Dn}. Hence, in this interval, we observe the
same number of E-breakpoints of Gn−2 and the relative equilibrium cost is λn(µ) = λn−2(µ)+2µ.
For some µ > µn−2 the equilibrium cost λn(µ) becomes equal to kn and the two external paths
{On, On−2, Dn} and {On, Dn−2, Dn} start being used at equilibrium. When this happens the
traffic flowing through the internal subnetwork Gn−2 decreases until it vanishes completely when
we reach µ = 2 kn. During this unloading of the internal subnetwork we go through the same
sequence of active networks observed during the loading phase, but in reverse order. In the final
stage, for µ > 2 kn we have an additional active network composed solely of the two external
paths. Altogether, we observe twice the number of E-breakpoints of the network Gn−2 plus one
in the final stage. The conclusion then follows by induction. 
We do not know whether the bound of 2n/2 in Proposition 4.5 is tight.
5. Examples and counterexamples
In this section we present a set of examples that illustrate the results of the previous sections.
The first example shows the difference between the set of E-breakpoints and the demands at
which the set of paths used at equilibrium changes.
Example 5.1. Given a selection of equilibrium flows f∗(µ), the values µ at which the set of used
paths changes may be different from the E-breakpoints. For instance, in the network of Fig. 3,
for all µ ≥ 2 and for any choice of ε ∈ [0, 1] the following is an equilibrium
path {O, v1, v2, D} {O, v1, D} {O, v2, D} {O,D}
flow 1− ε ε ε µ− 1− ε .
By letting ε oscillate between 0 and 1 arbitrarily often, the set of used paths might change an
arbitrary number of times, whereas the active network is always the set of edges in all four paths,
each of them with an equilibrium cost equal to 2.
Our second example shows that in general the set of non-regular demands may be strictly
larger than the set of E-breakpoints.
Example 5.2. Consider again Fig. 3 with the cost 2 in the lower link replaced by 2 + x, with
E-breakpoints at µ = 1 and µ = 2. Note that all the demands µ < 1 and µ > 2 are regular.
However, for µ ∈ (1, 2) the active network E(µ) is constant and comprises all the links, so that
there are no E-breakpoints, while the unique equilibrium sends a zero flow on the lower link and
hence µ is not regular. It is worth noting that, although the loss of regularity in the interval
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Ov1
v2
D
x
1
0
1
x
2
Figure 3. The set of paths used in equilibrium may change arbitrarily often.
(1, 2) precludes the use of Proposition 2.5, in this case the costs are affine so that the equilibrium
flows are piecewise affine and differentiable except at the E-breakpoints µ = 1 and µ = 2.
The next example deals with the fact that the PoA can attain the value 1 several times.
Example 5.3. In the example of Fig. 1, the price of anarchy shows an initial phase in which it
is identically equal to 1, after which it oscillates and eventually goes back to 1 but only asymp-
totically. The network of Fig. 4 (a), obtained by nesting two Wheatstone networks, provides an
example where the PoA can take the value 1 for small and large values of the demand, but also
at some intermediate value, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b). The idea of nesting Wheatstone networks
has been used by Lianeas et al. (2016), although in a different way.
O5
O3
D1 O1
D3
D5
x
7
1 x 7
x
0
1 x
(a) A nested Wheatstone network
5 10 15
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
(b) PoA for the nested Wheatstone example
Figure 4. An example where PoA goes back to 1 at intermediate demands
The network in Fig. 4(a) is the G5 network defined in the proof of Proposition 4.5, with k3 = 1
and k5 = 7. The five paths from origin to destination are
p1 = O5 → O3 → D5
p2 = O5 → D3 → D5
p3 = O5 → O3 → O1 → D3 → D5
p4 = O5 → O3 → D1 → D3 → D5
p5 = O5 → O3 → O1 → D1 → D3, D5
and the equilibrium flow for µ ∈ [0,+∞) is given explicitly in the following table:
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Interval Cost λ(µ) p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
µ ∈ [0, 1) 4µ 0 0 0 0 µ
µ ∈ [1, 2) 2 + 2µ 0 0 µ− 1 µ− 1 2− µ
µ ∈ [2, 4) 1 + 5
2
µ 0 0
µ
2
µ
2
0
µ ∈ [4, 8) 10 + µ
4
3
4
µ− 3 3
4
µ− 3 3− µ
4
3− µ
4
0
µ ∈ [8, 9) 12 µ− 5 µ− 5 9− µ 9− µ µ− 8
µ ∈ [9, 14) 42
5
+
2
5
µ
3
5
µ− 7
5
3
5
µ− 7
5
0 0
14
5
− µ
5
µ ≥ 14 7 + µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
0 0 0
Interestingly, in this example the path p5 is abandoned at equilibrium when µ = 2 and then
reactivated later when µ = 8. The optimum flow can be computed according to the scaling law
for Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) cost functions in Eq. (4.3), and the PoA is
PoA(µ) =

1 if µ ∈ [0, 12)
8µ2
−1 + 4µ+ 4µ2 if µ ∈ [
1
2 , 1)
4 + 4µ
2 + 5µ
if µ ∈ [1, 2)
4µ+ 10µ2
−36 + 40µ+ µ2 if µ ∈ [2, 4)
40µ+ µ2
−52 + 48µ if µ ∈ [4,
9
2)
200µ+ 5µ2
−98 + 168µ+ 8µ2 if µ ∈ [
9
2 , 7)
40 + µ
28 + 2µ
if µ ∈ [7, 8)
24
14 + µ
if µ ∈ [8, 9)
84 + 4µ
70 + 5µ
if µ ∈ [9, 14)
1 if µ ≥ 14,
(5.1)
whose plot is shown in Fig. 4 (b). Note that the PoA(µ) = 1 when µ ≤ 12 or µ ≥ 14, but also at
µ = 2.
Example 5.4. This example shows that the result in Proposition 4.4 fails for polynomials, even
for the simplest network topology. Indeed, consider the two-link parallel network with cost
functions
c1(x1) = x1,
c2(x2) = 1 + x
2
2.
(5.2)
The equilibrium and optimum flows can be computed explicitly as:
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demand x∗1(µ) x∗2(µ) x˜1(µ) x˜2(µ)
µ ∈ [0, 1/2] µ 0 µ 0
µ ∈ [1/2, 1] µ 0 µ− −1 +
√
6µ− 2
3
−1 +√6µ− 2
3
µ ∈ [1,+∞) µ− −1 +
√
4µ− 3
2
−1 +√4µ− 3
2
µ− −1 +
√
6µ− 2
3
−1 +√6µ− 2
3
Note that the sole E-breakpoint is at µ = 1. Moreover we have x∗1(3) = x˜1(3) = 2 and x∗2(3) =
x˜2(3) = 1 so that the equilibrium and optimal flows coincide, and PoA(3) = 1. This implies that
in the interval (3,+∞) the PoA has a local maximum (see Fig. 5).
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1.002
1.004
1.006
1.008
1.010
1.012
Figure 5. Plot of the PoA on the interval [2, 40] for the parallel network with costs as
in Eq. (5.2).
When the cost functions are less regular, the set of paths used at equilibrium can have a
recurring behavior, and an active network that is abandoned at some point can be reactivated
at larger demands. In particular we cannot ensure that the number of E-breakpoints is finite.
Proposition 5.1. For general smooth nondecreasing costs ce(·), a given active network E(µ) =
E0 can repeat itself over disjoint intervals defined by E-breakpoints.
Proof. Consider the network in Fig. 6 with the cost c(x) defined in [0, γ]∪ [γ+ ε,+∞] as follows
c(x) =
{
a if x ≤ γ
b if x ≥ γ + ε,
with 0 < ε < a < γ < γ + ε < b, and in the interval [γ, γ + ε] we interpolate in any way that
makes c(x) continuous and nondecreasing in the whole [0,+∞].
Then we have the following regimes:
(a) when µ ∈ [0, a], the equilibrium flow uses only the path {O, v1, v2, D}, the load on the
two edges {O, v2}, and {v1, D} is zero and the equilibrium cost is λ(µ) = 2µ;
(b) when µ ∈ (a, 2a), the equilibrium flow uses all the three paths with the following distri-
bution
path {O, v1, v2, D} {O, v1, D} {O, v2, D}
flow 2a− µ µ− a µ− a
the load on the two edges {O, v2}, {v1, D} is µ − a < γ, and the equilibrium cost is
λ(µ) = 2a;
(c) when µ ∈ [2a, 2γ], the equilibrium flow splits equally between the two paths {O, v1, D},
{O, v2, D}, the load on the two edges {O, v2}, {v1, D} is µ/2 ≤ γ, and the equilibrium
cost is λ(µ) = a+ µ/2;
(d) the regime on the demand interval [2γ, b+ γ + ε] is complicated to describe, but this is
not relevant for our purpose;
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Ov1
v2
D
x
c(x)
0
c(x)
x
Figure 6. Wheatsone network with non-affine costs.
(e) when µ ∈ [b+γ+ε, 2b), the equilibrium uses all three paths with the following distribution
path {O, v1, v2, D} {O, v1, D} {O, v2, D}
flow 2b− µ µ− b µ− b
the load on the two edges {O, v2}, {v1, D} is µ− b ≥ γ + ε, and the equilibrium cost is
λ(µ) = 2b;
(f) when µ ≥ 2b, the equilibrium flow splits equally between the two paths {O, v1, D},
{O, v2, D}, and the load on the two edges {O, v2}, {v1, D} is µ/2 > γ + ε.
This proves our claim, as in the intervals sub (c) and (f) the equilibrium uses only the two
paths {O, v1, D} and {O, v2, D}, while in the interval sub (b) and (e) it uses all three paths. 
Remark 5.1. Note that in the same way one can construct examples of networks with an infinite
number of E-breakpoints for the equilibrium. Furthermore, one can make the increasing sequence
of such E-breakpoints to be convergent. Indeed, one could chose infinite sequences (εi)i∈N,
(ai)i∈N, (γi)i∈N, (bi)i∈N with
0 < εi < ai < γi < γi + εi < bi < ai+1 for every i ∈ N. (5.3)
Then we set the cost function c(x) to be
c(x) =

a1 if x ≤ γ1
bi if γi + εi ≤ x ≤ ai+1 − bi
2
ai+1 if ai+1 ≤ x ≤ γi+1,
and in the intervals [γi, γi + ε], [(ai+1 − bi)/2, ai+1] we interpolate in any way that makes c(x)
continuous and nondecreasing in the whole [0,+∞]. With this choice of c(x), the situation is
similar to the one of Proposition 5.1, repeated infinitely many times. Furthermore, since the εi
can be as small as we want, we can choose the sequences (ai)i∈N, (γi)i∈N, (bi)i∈N to be convergent
to the same limit.
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6. List of symbols
ae coefficient of the monomial in an affine cost function
A (Aij)i,j=1,...,n
Aij
∑
e∈pi∩pj ae
be constant in an affine cost function
b (b1, . . . , bm)
>
ce cost of edge e
c (c1, . . . , cm)
>
c˜e(xe) C˜
′
e(xe), defined in Eq. (3.2)
Ce primitive of ce, defined in Eq. (2.6)
C˜e(xe) xe ce(xe)
cp cost of path p, defined in Eq. (2.2)
d degree of the BPR cost functions
D destination of the network
Dµ dual problem
e edge
E set of edges
E active network, defined in Definition 2.2
f flow profile
f∗ equilibrium flow profile
f˜ optimum flow profile
fp flow of path p
Fµ set of flows of total demand µ, defined in Eq. (2.1)
F0 {f ∈ Rn+ : fp > 0⇒ p ∈ %}
G graph
m card(E)
n card(P)
N+(v) out-edges of vertex v
N−(v) in-edges of vertex v
O origin of the network
p path
P set of paths
Pµ primal problem
PoA price of anarchy
S solution set
SC social cost, defined in Eq. (2.3)
Tv equilibrium cost of shortest path to v, defined in Eq. (2.18)
V set of vertices
vµ(z) inff ϕµ(f , z), defined in Eq. (2.11)
V (µ) solution of the equilibrium minimization problem, defined in Eq. (2.5)
V˜ (µ) solution of the optimum minimization problem, defined in Eq. (3.1)
x load profile
x∗ equilibrium load profile
xe load of edge e
Xµ set of loads of total demand µ
Z edge-path incidence matrix
α element of [0, 1]
β (β1, . . . , βn)
βi
∑
e∈pi be
λ equilibrium cost, defined in Eq. (2.4)
µ demand
21
µ0 E-breakpoint for the equilibrium, defined in Definition 2.2
µ˜0 E-breakpoint for the optimum
% subset of P
τe equilibrium cost of edge e
ϕµ perturbation function, defined in Eq. (2.10)
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